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This paper was originally written as a background document for the 
ILO's input to the second United Nations Conference on Human 
Settlements (Habitat II) held at Istanbul, 3-14th June 1996. In 
recognition of the active role of the ILO in preparation for 
Habitat II, the Habitat Secretariat called upon it to organise the 
Habitat II Dialogue (No 4) for the 21st century on the Future of 
Urban Employment as a contribution to the Istanbul Conference. The 
paper, ILO (1996), The Future of Urban Employment was specifically 
prepared for this Dialogue and was the subject of extensive 
discussions at the preparatory meetings prior to the Habitat II 
Conference and at the Conference itself. 
 There are two reasons for publishing this revised version of 
the background paper [Singh (1995)] as a Discussion Paper. The 
first is that it presents in greater detail some of the analytical 
arguments put forward in ILO (1996). Secondly, the present paper 
takes the analysis further by responding to some of the main 
issues which were raised in the debates on ILO (1996) as a part of 
Dialogue 4. 
 The paper examines the present crisis of the cities both in 
the rich countries (the North) and the poor countries (the South). 
However, as in the case of ILO (1996), it is focused on "urban 
employment: the underlying thesis is that creating and protecting 
employment can be the determining factor in easing, if not 
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resolving, the multi-dimension crisis faced by many cities world 
wide."
1
 Apart from its own merits, such a focus is also 
appropriate in the light of the Programme of Action of the World 
Summit for Social Development which declared that governments 
should promote and pursue "active policies for full, productive, 
appropriately remunerative and freely chosen employment". 
 In its examination of the crisis of the cities and the 
question of urban employment, this paper gives primary attention 
to the relevant analytical issues. It is much less concerned with 
policy questions or with providing detailed policy 
recommendations.  For these the reader is referred to ILO (1996) 
which gives a comprehensive account of policy measures and 
recommendations in various areas.  Nevertheless, the present paper 
does outline the broad approaches to policy which emerge from the 
analytical discussion. 
 The main analysis of the paper is concerned with the 
following issues: 
(1) The long-term relationship between economic development, 
structural changes in the economy, urbanisation and urban 
employment. 
 
                     
 
   
1
See the Preface to ILO (1996). 
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(2) Will there be enough work in the 21st century for all people 
to be gainfully employed?  Or, will the nature of technical 
change mean that there will not be enough work for everybody 
if people work the same number of hours as they do now, or 
else will the number of hours worked have to be reduced to 
permit everybody to be employed? This involves, inter alia, 
an analysis of the question of "jobless growth" as well as a 
consideration of the role of the information and 
communications technology (ICT) "revolution". 
 
(3) The impact of the liberalisation and globalisation of the 
world's economy on cities and their employment prospects. 
 
(4) The role of the informal sector and its relationship to the 
formal sector: implications for real wages and employment. 
 
(5) Cities, environment and employment; is there a trade-off 
between environment and employment? 
  
(6)  The economies and diseconomies of agglomeration and the 
question of the optimum city size; and the nature of the 
differences between cities in the third world and cities in 
the advanced countries. 
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  The paper is organised as follows. Part 1 outlines the 
present trends in urbanisation in different regions of the world 
and considers the nature and dimensions of the problems of 
unemployment and underemployment which towns and cities in these 
regions face. It also sets out in some detail the main 
characteristics of the urban labour markets in both the North and 
the South. Part 2 is the analytical core of the paper and is 
concerned with the issues listed above. Part 3 examines the broad 
approaches to policy for urban employment which follow from the 
analysis of Part II.  
 
 
 
Part 1 
 
II. The Context  
 
Two important long run characteristics of the world economy in 
the second half of the twentieth century have been : (a) rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation of developing counties (the 
South) and (b) the deindustrialisation (in the sense of a 
declining number or proportion of people employed in 
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manufacturing) of the older industrial countries (the North). 
, both the third world's industrial revolution and de-
industrialisation in the rich countries proceeded by and large in 
an orderly way, if not always smoothly. However, the associated 
processes of rapid urbanisation and large scale rural-urban 
migration in developing countries were far less orderly or 
smooth. The problems of urban poverty, squalid living conditions, 
shanty towns and slums began to manifest themselves in towns and 
cities throughout the developing world. Similarly, in rich 
countries, the flight to suburbs of the wealthy and the 
impoverishment of inner cities started to take shape even in this 
period of fast growth and high employment. 
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However, in the last twenty years, world economic growth has 
decelerated considerably; it has also become much more unstable 
than before. The result has been the reappearance of mass 
unemployment in Europe and the interruption of the industrial 
revolution in many parts of the third world. These developments 
in turn have contributed significantly to a deepening crisis of 
the cities and towns in the North as well as the South. Richard 
Rogers in his BBC Reith Lectures in 1995 observed as follows with 
respect to the problems of cities:
2
 
 
 Cities have become socially divisive and environmentally 
hazardous. And if we in Britain think that our problems of 
pollution, congestion and inner-city decay are appalling, 
look at the massive changes that are overwhelming the cities 
of the developing world. 
 
 In 1990, of the 35 cities with populations over 5 million, 
22 were in the developing world. By the year 2000 the number 
of cities in the developing world will double. Two billion 
people are expected to be added to the urban population of 
the developing world within 30 years. And this, even though 
at least half of the new urban population will be living in 
shanty towns with no running water, no electricity, no 
sanitation, and no hope.  
 
 
Another distinguished student of urban development, Janice 
Perlman, notes the growing convergence in the difficulties faced 
by large cities all over the globe:  
 
                     
    
2
 Rogers (1995) 
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 Every city has a unique history, its own subculture, a 
built environment representing its specific evolution 
and both physical and abstract symbols which capture 
its meaning to its own population. Yet despite these 
differences, all very large cities have a great deal in 
common. Regardless of demographic specifics, economic 
development level, political structure or cultural 
rules, all of them face the challenge of meeting the 
needs of their vast and growing populations on severely 
limited municipal budgets. All struggle daily  with air 
pollution, traffic congestion, drugs, crime and 
homelessness. All are increasingly polarised between 
rich and poor, and the poor areas (in different cities) 
are becoming virtually indistinguishable from one 
another. 
  
 
 In fact, every first world city today has within it a 
third world city in which unemployment, over crowding, 
hunger, disease, malnutrition and high infant mortality 
are the norm. And likewise, every third world city has 
in it a first world city of international fashion, 
high-technology operations, global communications, 
transnational corporations and post-modern taste. There 
is a huge gulf between these two worlds, and a strong 
resistance on part of the privileged to any fundamental 
changes which threaten the status quo.
3
 [parenthesis 
added] 
   
 
A central challenge for cities in both the North and the South is 
that of providing remunerative employment opportunities for all 
those who seek them. In the North, European cities are faced with 
high rates of youth and overall unemployment, whilst in U.S. 
cities, there is less unemployment but nevertheless considerable 
job insecurity as well as stagnant real wages for nearly two 
decades. What is required therefore in the urban US is good jobs, 
                     
    
3
 Perlman (1990), pp 13-14. 
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not any jobs. Towns and cities of the South are however 
confronted with an even greater task in this respect. Not only do 
they have to provide employment for the very large number of 
currently unemployed and underemployed, they also have the 
immense burden of creating jobs for an urban labour force which 
is expected to continue to grow in the foreseeable future at a 
rate of over 3% per annum. 
 
The ability of the urban economy to create sufficient job 
opportunities now and in the future, to make the cities as places 
where people can live with dignity, and indeed to transform them 
into proud emblems of humanity and civilisation requires careful 
research and analysis. It also calls for long term and 
imaginative policy approaches to the present urban crisis.  This 
is all the more necessary if the cities are to harness the 
opportunities - and not be overwhelmed by the hazards - which 
follow from the ICT revolution, as well as the liberalisation and 
globalisation of the international economy.  
 
  
III. Dimensions of Urban Population Growth in Historical 
Perspective 
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The world urban population has increased almost ten-fold between 
1950 and 1990, from 200 million to 2 billion. 
. The U.N. projections 
(see table 1) indicate that by the year 2015 more than half of 
the population of developing countries will be living in urban 
areas.  
 
Secondly, in contrast to the experience of industrial countries 
during the course of their economic development, the contemporary 
growth of urban population in the South has been extraordinarily 
fast.  Bairoch (1983) estimated that between 1950 and 2025, the 
South's urban population would have increased almost sixteen-
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fold, while the North's urban population only rose five-fold 
between 1840 and 1914 -  the period of its most rapid economic 
growth. These facts have the important consequence, rightly noted 
in World Bank (1979): 
  
 Whereas urbanisation in the industrialised countries 
took many decades, permitting a gradual emergence of 
economic, social and political institutions to deal 
with the problems of transformation, the process in 
developing countries is occurring far more rapidly, 
against a background of higher population growth, lower 
incomes, and fewer opportunities for international 
migration. 
 
 
Thirdly, there are important regional differences in the degree 
of urbanisation among developing countries (table 2). Latin 
America and Eastern Europe
4
 have the highest incidence  of 
urbanisation in the South - it is now almost as high as that in 
the North. The level of urbanisation, however, is much lower in 
Africa and Asia, with the result that urban population in these 
two regions is growing at a much faster rate than elsewhere and 
will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.[See Table 3] 
 
                     
    
4
 Note that the source of this table is the World Bank and 
that of Table 1 is UN. Therefore there may not be an exact 
correspondence between the 'less developed regions' in Table 1 and 
the 'low and middle income countries' in Table 2. 
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 [TABLE 2 AND 3 GO HERE] 
 
 
Fourthly, Chart 1 displays the outstanding fact that the world's 
largest cities today are increasingly found in developing 
countries. In 1950, there were only two cities, London and New 
York with populations of more than 10 million. By 1994, of the 15 
such cities in the world, 11 were in the South and London was no 
longer in the top 15. World Bank projections indicate that two 
decades from now, of the world's 28 largest cities with 
population of 10 million or more, 24 will be in developing 
countries, and only four in rich countries. Although Tokyo will 
still be the world's biggest city with population approaching 30 
million (closely followed by Bombay), New York by then will have 
dropped to the thirteenth place in the league table. 
 
 [CHART 1 GOES HERE] 
 
Fifthly, an important related point which highlights the 
difference between rich and poor countries in their present 
urbanisation processes is that the population of large cities 
(population greater than four million) in developing countries is 
growing much faster than that of their smaller cities. However in 
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developed countries, large cities have generally been losing 
population, which explains the trends evidenced in Chart 1.
5
 
                     
    
5
 see I. Sachs (1986); and Singh (1992b). 
  
 
 18 
IV.  Urban Labour Markets in the North and the South: 
Unemployment, Underemployment, Informalisation and Urban Poverty. 
 
As noted previously, some of the central elements in the crisis 
of the cities, in the North as well as the South, are the lack of 
adequate employment opportunities, job insecurity and low wages 
for many of those who are employed, as well as widespread 
poverty. The main characteristics of the urban labour markets in 
different regions may be summarised as follows. 
 
The North 
1. As most people in the North live in cities, the current mass 
unemployment there is necessarily an urban phenomenon. There has 
been a large trend increase in unemployment rates in most 
industrial countries since 1973.  In 1970 there were 8 million 
people unemployed in OECD countries; in 1994 the unemployed 
numbered 35 million, about 10% of the labour force. The rise in 
unemployment has been particularly marked in West European 
countries.  West Germany provides a striking example of this.  It 
is a remarkable fact that between 1964 and 1973 the average rate 
of unemployment in West Germany was less than 1% of the labour 
force.  The corresponding unemployment rate for the last ten 
years (i.e. 1986-1995) has been over 8% of the labour force and 
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is rising. In this context it is also important to recall that 
between 1964-1973, West Germany not only had full employment for 
its own citizens but also provided jobs for large members of 
"guest workers" from Turkey and other countries. The immigrants 
constituted almost 10% of the labour force in that period. As 
many guest workers subsequently became permanent residents, the 
present mass unemployment has produced serious tensions between 
the indigenous and immigrant communities in several German as 
well as European cities.   
 
2. In addition to the current high recorded rates of 
unemployment, a considerable proportion of the workforce in 
advanced economies is presently obliged to work part-time, or is 
too discouraged by the lack of employment opportunities to look 
for work at all.  If these involuntary part time and discouraged 
workers are included, it is estimated that this would raise the 
OECD unemployment rate by half as much (OECD (1994)). 
 
3. (a) Unemployment rates have been appreciably lower in the U.S. 
than in Western Europe.  Between 1964 and 1973, the U.S. 
unemployment rate averaged 4.5%. During the last ten years (1986 
to 1995), it has been higher (6.4%), but not as high as in 
Western Europe.   
  
 
 20 
 
(b) Despite this superior U.S. performance relative to Western 
Europe in relation to open unemployment, the U.S. nevertheless 
has a large army of underemployed people.  Thurow (1996, p.56) 
observes: 
 
"There are 8.1 million American workers in temporary jobs, 2 
million who work ‘on call’ and 8.3 million self-employed 
‘independent contractors’ (many of whom are down-sized 
professionals who have very few clients but call themselves self-
employed consultants because they are too proud to admit that 
they are unemployed).  Most of these more than 18 million people 
are looking for more work and better jobs.  Together these 
contingent workers account for 14 percent of the workforce." 
 
(c) he average real wage for non-supervisory workers in the U.S. 
declined at a rate of 0.3% per annum in the 1970s, 1.0% per annum 
in the 1980s and 0.3% per annum between 1990 to 1994.  In 
contrast in the 1960s, the corresponding average real wage rose 
at a rate of 1.4% per annum (Pollin & Zahrt, 1996).  
 
(d) In addition to the huge underemployment and stationary or 
declining real wages, another unfavourable aspect of the labour 
market experience in the U.S. in the recent period has been the 
growing inequality of wages.  Wage dispersion had decreased in 
the U.S. during the 1950s and 1960s but wages have become much 
more unequal during the last two decades.  Wage dispersion has 
also greatly increased in the UK over the last fifteen years.  
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However in continental Western Europe there has been very little 
change in the recent period. 
 
The South 
1. The unemployment challenge facing towns and cities in 
developing countries today is somewhat different from that which 
confronts their counterparts in advanced countries. Since in 
developing countries, there is hardly any public provision or 
welfare payments for those who become unemployed, most urban 
residents in these countries are obliged to seek work, howsoever 
unremunerative it may be.  Consequently, the recorded rates of 
unemployment in developing countries tend to be generally low. 
 
This may be illustrated by the case of Mexico. Mexico, although 
still a developing country, joined the OECD - the rich countries 
club - following its entry into NAFTA. At a time of large scale 
unemployment in industrial countries, it turns out that the 
country with one of the lowest unemployment rates in the OECD is 
Mexico - its recorded unemployment rate was 2.9 percent in 1992, 
3.5 percent in 1993 and 3.7 per cent in 1994 compared with double 
digit rates in several European economies. OECD (1992) rightly 
notes: 
"As there is no unemployment insurance in Mexico, the open 
unemployment rate is not very sensitive to economic cycles; once 
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out of a job in the formal sector of the economy most people have 
to find some remunerative activity unless they belong to high 
income categories" (page 103). 
 
The employment problem in the South thus manifests itself 
primarily in the forms of underemployment and low 
productivity/low remuneration work, often called 'disguised 
unemployment', following Joan Robinson.
6
 More significantly, 
however, as noted earlier the urban labour force in a majority of 
developing countries is increasing at a very fast rate of about 
3% per annum. This is partly due to migration but largely due to 
natural increase.
7
 The employment challenge before these 
countries is therefore not only to reduce the existing large 
disguised unemployment, but also to provide adequately 
remunerative jobs for the rapidly growing new entrants to the 
labour force.   
 
To illustrate, UN estimates for the Asia-Pacific countries 
indicate that between 1980 and 1990, 40% of the total labour 
force growth took place in the urban areas in these countries.  
                     
    
6
Joan Robinson had introduced the concept in relation to 
unemployment in advanced countries in the 1930s. As we shall see 
below it is becoming relevant again in advanced countries such as 
the US where welfare state provisions have been greatly reduced 
and labour markets made "more flexible". 
    
7
This point is taken up in Part II  below. 
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For 1990-2000 the corresponding proportion is expected to be 61%. 
By the period 2000-2010, urban labour force growth for the Asia-
Pacific region will represent 96% of all labour force growth.  UN 
1995 notes that "translated in numbers of people, the urban 
labour force of the ESCAP region will grow by 328 million in the 
20 years between 1990 and 2010. Therefore, the problem of urban 
labour force absorbtion will be a major concern for 
governments".(UN 1995, page 2-26)  
 
Similarly, Tokman (1997) reports that in Latin America, for 
demographic reasons, the rate of growth of total labour force 
fell from 3.5% per annum in 1985 to 3% per annum in 1995. However 
the rate of growth of urban labour force continued to be more 
than 3% per annum since rural migration to the cities increased 
the urban proportion of labour force from a little over two-
thirds in 1980 to slightly more than three-quarters in 1995.  
 
To appreciate the dimensions of the task of providing 
renumerative employment to this burgeoning urban labour force in 
developing countries, it is useful to turn to the observed 
statistical relationships between the growth of output and the 
growth of employment. These data suggest that for a labour force 
growing at 3% a year, the overall growth rate would need to be 
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about 6% per annum just to provide jobs to the new entrants to 
the labour force.
8
  The overall rate of economic growth would 
have to be higher still if the existing backlog of 
underemployment and open unemployment is also to be appreciably 
reduced. However, Table 4 indicates that during "the lost decade" 
of the 1980s, the Latin American economies expanded at a rate of 
only 1.6% per annum. Moreover even with the recovery from the 
debt crisis in the 1990s these countries  have only been able to 
grow at just about half the required rate. Yet in the same table, 
the post-1980 record of the East Asian countries indicates that 
this is by no means an over ambitious task. These economies have 
expanded at a rate of well over 7% per annum during 1980-1995. 
 
3. These  differences between East Asian and Latin American 
economic growth are reflected in the urban labour market 
experiences of the two groups of countries in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
 
The ILO's World Employment Report for 1995 summarised the labour 
market conditions in the fast growing East Asian and South-East 
Asian economies during this period as follows: 
                     
    
8
See further Singh and Zammit (1995) 
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(a)  total employment grew rapidly in the 1980s, with a marked 
acceleration in the latter half of the decade.  The growth 
rates ranged from 2.3 percent in Hong Kong to 5.9 percent in 
Singapore; 
(b)  as a result, unemployment fell between the mid-1980s and the 
early 1990s.  The unemployment rates in the latter period 
were extremely low, ranging from 2.0 to 2.7 percent; 
  
(c) in some countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and 
China, labour shortages emerged and there was  significant 
immigration of labour from neighbouring lower-income 
countries; 
 
(d) employment growth was spearheaded by the manufacturing 
sector.  Manufacturing employment grew at a rate of over 6 
percent per annum during the 1980s for the dynamic economies 
of the region; 
 
(e) as a result, the structure of employment continued to shift 
to manufacturing and other high-productivity activities in 
the modern sector rising from about 7 percent of total 
employment in 1960 to around 18 percent by 1994.  This 
presented growing opportunities for those in low-
productivity activities to move into better modern-sector 
jobs, thereby sharing in the gains from growth; 
 
(f) at the same time real earnings grew steadily, with the rate 
of growth averaging a little over 5 percent per annum during 
the 1980s.
9
 
                     
    
9
ILO (1995), page? 
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The contrasting situation with respect to the urban labour 
markets in slow-growing Latin American countries during the 1980s 
and 1990s is reported below: 
 
(a) There was a steady fall in modern-sector employment between 
1980 and 1992, with paid employment falling at a rate of 
about 0.1 percent per annum during the 1980s.  This reversed 
the trend of the previous three decades, when steady 
economic growth had led to a significant  expansion of 
modern-sector employment. (ILO 1995, Page ?) 
(b) Informal sector employment rose from 40% of non-
 agricultural employment in 1980 to 50% in the early 
 1990s. Between 1980-1995, 8 out of each 10 new jobs 
 created during this period were low quality informal  jobs. 
(Tokman 1997) 
 
(c) Between 1980 and 1990, the average real wage in 
 manufacturing in Latin American economies fell by 13% and 
 the minimum real wage by more than 30%. With the economic 
 recovery after the debt crisis in the 1990s the average 
 real manufacturing wage rose but in 1995 it was still  below 
its 1980 level. (Tokman 1997) 
 
5. Urban Poverty 
Although in developing countries as a whole, more of the absolute 
poor are still living in rural areas, as urbanisation proceeds, 
poverty is becoming esentially an urban phenomenon. The World 
Bank's estimates of the incidence of urban poverty in developing 
countries suggest that a quarter of the South's urban population 
in 1988 lived in absolute poverty - the incidence was the highest 
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in African cities (41.6%) and the lowest in the Asian cities 
(23%).
10
 In Latin America the corresponding figure was 34.2%. 
 
Tokman (1997) describes the  urbanisation of poverty in Latin 
America in the 1980s: 
 The poor performance of the eighties resulted in an 
increase in poverty. The percentage of households below 
the poverty line increased from 35 to 39 per cent, 
interrupting the declining trend shown previous to the 
crisis. Rural poverty, however, remained constant while 
the expansion was concentrated in the cities. Poverty 
at  the end of the last decade became mostly urban. 63 
per cent of poor households are urban dwellers. In 
addition, 88 per cent of the 60 million new poor are 
urban. Poverty  expansion has also concentrated in 
the non indigent poor accounting for 80 per cent of the 
new poor. This is the result of the deterioration of 
middle groups due to the changes in the employment 
situation and the reduction of social expenditure 
combined with the processes of privatisation and 
targeting." 
 
Part II  Analytical Issues 
 
To reiterate, a central policy task facing the cities both in the 
North and the South is to ensure that in an increasingly 
competitive world economy, subject to rapid technical change, 
there is enough work and jobs, indeed good jobs for their current 
and potential labour forces.  In the way that our societies are 
                     
    
10
There is evidence that the incidence of poverty in East and 
South-East Asian countries fell appreciably in the 1980s and 90s 
as a consequence of fast growth of output, employment and real 
wages. 
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presently organized, most people would accept that unemployment 
is not only an economic waste, but it also leads to social 
degradation, to ill-health and indeed to criminality.  It lowers 
self-esteem, is demotivating, creates insecurity, resistance to 
technical change, among other negative effects.  Unemployment is 
therefore deeply damaging to the status of the citizen.  The 
question of employment is crucial because of its all-pervading, 
comprehensive economic and social linkages.  Creating sufficient 
numbers of productive, adequately-paid jobs is therefore key to 
the many-sided problems confronting the cities: poverty, urban 
squalor, drugs and crime. 
 
For this purpose, part II will analyse a number of long-run 
factors which may affect job creation and the future of urban 
employment.  Specifically, we consider below the impact of the 
following elements: (a) long-term structural changes which are 
endogenous to economic development itself; (b) liberalisation and 
globalisation;(c)technology; (d)  flexibility of the labour 
market and the informal sector;(e)  environment; (f)  
agglomeration and the question of the optimum city size; 
 
Economic analysis and economic history suggest that as an economy 
develops and per capita income increases, there are important 
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changes in its structures of production and employment.  Classic 
emprical studies by Kuznets (1971), Colin Clark, and Chenery et 
al. indicate the following regularities in these spheres: 
 (a) The share of agriculture in employment declines, while 
that of industry and services increase. 
 (b) There is, however, a non-linear relationship betwen the 
growth of industrial employment and per capita income.  In 
the earlt stages of economic development, both services and 
employment expand at the expense of agriculture.  However, 
once a veryhigh level of percapita income is reached, 
industrial employment begins to decline while that of 
services continues to increase (see chart 3). 
Structural evolution of production during the course of 
development is somewhat different than that of employment.  The 
share of manufacturing in constant prices rises with growing per 
capita income.  At very high levels of per capita income, it may 
decline slightly or even remain stable (see chart 4).  However, 
in current prices, the share of manufacturing is more likely to 
follow a non-linear pattern of the kind observed for employment. 
 
Economic analysis suggests that these observed regularities in 
the structure of production and employment are caused by the 
differences in the income elasticity of demand, e, and the rate 
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of growth of productivity, p, of the three broad sectors - 
agriculture (a), manufacturing (m) and services (s) - of the 
economy.  The essential stylized facts concerning e and p in the 
three sectors can be summarized as follows: 
   (1)   e of (a) < e of (m) = e of (s)  
   (2)   p of (a) = p of (m) > p of (s) 
where the letters in the parentheses refer to the economic 
sectors.  Equation (1) suggests that the income elasticity of 
demand in agriculture tends to be much lower than that in 
manufactures (so-called Engel’s Law): the former is usually less 
than one whilst the latter may be two or three.  At high levels 
of per capita income, income elasticity of demand in services, 
studies show, may be somewhat greater than that of manufacturing, 
bit since productivity growth in manufacturing commonly exceeds 
that of services (see equation (2)), manufacturing prices fall 
relative to services prices.  If both the relative prices and 
income effects are taken into account, the rate of growth of 
total demand for services may be no greater than hat of 
manufacturing.  This is the main reason why the change in the 
structure of output follows a different pattern than that of 
employment, as indicated in charts 3 and 4 above.   
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If equations (1) and (2) hold, it can be shown that, over time, 
the share of agriculture and manufacturing in emplyment will 
eventually be greatly reduced and most of the labour force will 
tend to be employed in the service sector.  As in early stages of 
development the bulk of economic activity originates in the 
agricultural sector it follows that until a fairly high level of 
per capita income is reached, the manufacturing sector will 
expand at the expense of agriculture, in terms of both output and 
employment; it is only in the long-term that labour will shift 
out of manufacturing into services (deindustrialisation).
11
  As 
long as the rate of growth of demand for manufactures remain the 
same as for services even at high levels of per capita income, 
there is no reason why the share of manufacturinf in total output 
should decline.    
 
It is significant that although the share of manufacturing in 
employment declines at a high level of per capita income, the 
relationship betwen per capita income and urbanisation is linear 
(see chart 5).  The analytical reason for this linear 
relationship lies in the fact that manufacturing and many service 
industries benefit from economies of aglomeration found in many 
                     
  
11
  For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Singh (1987); 
Singh and Tabatabai (1993); Rowthorn and wells (1987) and Baumol 
et al. (1989). 
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urban areas (see further Part 3 on this).  Thus, in developing 
countries urbanisation is usually based on industrialisation.  In 
advanced countries with a very high level of per capita income 
the mainstay of many cities may therefore be services.    
 
 
 
 
 
All of these are big subjects. However, our purpose here is not 
to summarise the literature in each area, but rather to bring out 
the issues which are salient to policy, particularly with respect 
to employment,unemployment, productivity and real wages. Again, 
where appropriate, the differences in the analyses of these 
issues for developing and developed countries will be high-
lighted. 
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Goldsmith and Olpadwala (1992) provide evidence on the 
relationship between poverty and environmental degradation.  They 
write: 
The evidence today is overwhelming that the poor in cities suffer 
disproportionately from environmental problems.  In Papua New 
Guinea's city of Port Moresby, for example, "water, sewage, and 
garbage collection was provided only to the rich who were long 
heavily subsidized owing to the low prices charged."  We also 
find that "in Mexico City, the highest concentrations of dust 
particles in the air are found in the south-east and north-east 
areas where lower income groups live.  In Manila, some 20,000 
people live around a garbage dump known as Smokey 
Mountain...Moving to a cleaner, safer location is beyond their 
means."  More generally, "it is virtually always the poorest 
groups who suffer most from floods, landslides or other 'natural` 
disasters."  The consequences are predictable: "the urban poor 
have infant mortality rates that are two and sometimes three 
times higher than the middle- and upper-income groups in the same 
city. (footnotes omitted)  
 
More significantly, the employment challenge in the Third World 
cities lies in creating jobs not just for the currently 
unemployed and underemployed, but rather for an urban labour 
force which is growing at the rate of about 3% per annum. 
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 Box 3 
 'Urban` Population, Statistical Definition 
 
Countries use a wide variety of criteria for defining "urban" 
population.  UN (1987) notes: "The most common criterion for 
urban population is a minimum number of people but the figure 
differs from country to country, reflecting a variety of social 
and geographical conditions.  For example, an urban population is 
defined as at least 200 persons in Denmark, Greenland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden, but as 20,000 in Mauritius and Nigeria, and as 
30,000 in Japan; most countries choose a minimum between 2,000 
and 5,000 persons.  Other criteria that are used to define an 
urban area are the number of dwelling units in a locality and 
characteristics of settlement, such as population density, 
economic activity, and living facilities.  There are also several 
ways to define 'urban agglomeration`.  For example, it may be 
defined in terms of the administrative boundaries of cities or by 
areas of high population density."  The UN data cited in the 
tables in this section are based on national definitions of urban 
and rural populations.  UN (1987) states: "The practice was 
adopted, after lengthy study and discussion, on the grounds that 
the national statistical authorities were in the best position to 
distinguish the two populations in their own countries."
12
 
                     
    
12
  Quoted in Singh (1992b). 
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 PART 2 
 
 
IV. STRUCTURAL CHANGE, LONG TERM ECONOMIC GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT AND 
URBANISATION 
 
IV.1.  Economic Significance of Cities 
 
Despite all the enormous problems of poverty, unemployment and 
other deprivations of the cities, they also embody for developing 
countries their hopes for the future.  Urbanisation and 
industrialisation are the inevitable structural consequences of 
the process of economic development.  As the discussion below 
will show, in general, the higher the level of a country's per 
capita income, the greater is its degree of urbanisation and also 
greater is the extent of its industrialisation until a very high 
level of per capita income is reached.  It is in view of these 
analytical and empirical relationships that cities are regarded 
as engines of economic growth. 
 
Indeed, in large parts of the third world much the bigger 
fraction of GDP originates in the urban sector even though the 
latter accounts for a relatively small proportion of total 
population or employment.  For example, although Kenya is 23 
percent urban, Nigeria 35 percent and India 27 percent, in all 
three countries, cities account for 70 percent of gross domestic 
product (Olpadwala and Goldsmith,1992).  Chart 2 presents similar 
data for other cities and countries.  Sao Paulo, for example, 
accounts for a tenth of Brazil's population but over a third of 
its GDP. 
 
 [CHART 2 COMES HERE] 
 
IV.2.  Long Term Economic Growth and Structural Change 
 
Economic analysis sheds important light on this apparent paradox 
of enormous failings of the cities to meet the minimum needs of 
their people and their concurrent role as engines of economic 
growth.  Economists note that long-term economic development has 
always been accompanied by far reaching changes in the structures 
of production, employment, demand, foreign trade and other 
variables.  On the basis of the historical experience of today's 
developed countries, Kuznets (1971) in his classical study 
derived the following generalisations. 
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 (a)  Long-term economic development is associated with a 
rise in the share of manufacturing in national output and a 
decline in that of agriculture. 
 
 (b)  The proportion of labour force employment in 
agriculture declines while that in manufacturing steadily 
increases until the country reaches a very high level of per 
capita income. 
 
 (c)  Both (a) and (b) are accompanied by an expanding market 
for industrial goods. 
 
These empirical findings have been confirmed in more recent 
research and can be explained in terms of the differences in the 
income elasticity of demand, 'e' and the rate of growth of 
production, 'p' of the three broad sectors - agriculture(a), 
manufacturing(m) and services(s) - of the economy.  The essential 
stylized facts concerning 'e' and 'p' in the three sectors can be 
summarized as follows: 
 'e'of(a) < 'e'of(m) = 'e'of(s) 
 'p'of(a) = 'p'of(m) > 'p'of(s)  
where the letters in the parentheses refer to the economic 
sectors.  If these relationships hold, it can be shown that, over 
time, the share of agriculture and manufacturing in employment 
will eventually be greatly reduced and most of the labour force 
will tend to be employed in the service sector, as is 
increasingly the case in the advanced economies.  As the bulk of 
economic activity originates in the agricultural sector it 
follows that in the early stages of development, and until a 
fairly high level of per capita income is reached, the 
manufacturing sector will expand at the expense of agriculture, 
in terms of both output and employment; it is only in the long 
term that labour will shift out of manufacturing into services.
13
 
 
 
IV.3.  Urbanisation and Per Capita Income 
 
It is significant that although the share of manufacturing in 
employment declines at a high level of per capita income, the 
relationship between per capita income and urbanisation is linear 
(see chart 2).  The analytical reason for this linear 
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  For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Singh (1987); 
Singh and Tabatabai (1993); Rowthorn and Wells (1987) and Baumol 
et al (1989). 
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relationship lies in the fact that manufacturing and many service 
industries benefit from economies of agglomeration found in many 
urban areas (see further Part 3 on this).  Thus, in developing 
countries urbanisation is usually based on industrialisation.  In 
advanced countries with a very high level of per capita income 
the mainstay of many cities may therefore be services. 
 
IV.4.  Structural Change, Employment and Rural Urban Migration 
 
In considering the future of urban employment for developing 
countries, a central question is how far agriculture has the 
capacity to employ more labour, and how far this would be 
desirable.  Here there is a significant dilemma.  For the 
structural reasons outlined earlier - and also because technical 
progress in agriculture is generally both labour-saving and land-
saving - the long-run employment elasticity of agricultural 
output tends to be very small, if not negative.  Singh and 
Tabatabai (1993) provide estimates of the "measured employment 
elasticity" in agriculture for different groups of countries, 
over the period 1960-1990.   
 
 
Developed market economies       -1.94 
Developing market economies       0.48 
Latin America                     0.25 
Sub-Saharan Africa                0.90 
South and South-East Asia         0.43 
 
Singh and Tabatabai note that these are crude elasticities, 
obtained as the ratio of the rate of growth of the economically 
active population in agriculture to that of agricultural output. 
 Thus the figures do not necessarily reflect solely the supply 
response of the labour force to increases in agricultural 
production: the share of the economically active population in 
agriculture can rise without any concomitant expansion of the 
agrarian economy if there are insufficient employment 
opportunities outside the sector.  Nevertheless, the measured 
employment elasticities for the developed market economies are 
negative and for the Latin American countries quite small. 
 
In addition to this broad global analysis of employment 
elasticities in agriculture, Singh and Tabatabai also cite some 
detailed micro-economic evidence on 'genuine' employment 
elasticities which is more significant.  Empirical research on 
the Indian Green Revolution indicates that, as the agrarian 
economy moves from one to two or more crops, the demand for 
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agricultural labour rises.  But once multiple cropping has been 
achieved, genuine employment elasticity begins to decline and it 
may even become negative, as is the case in the advanced 
countries.  Thus even though in a number of developing countries 
there may be a short- to medium-term increase in the employment 
capacity of the agrarian economy as the Green Revolution-type 
technologies are introduced, over the longer term (say, after a 
decade) the employment elasticity would be expected to decline. 
 
This important structural characteristic of agricultural 
employment during the course of economic development was 
emphasized by the late Arthur Lewis (1978) as the essential 
reason for rural-urban migration.  He noted that the natural 
population increase in rural areas has to find employment in 
towns.  For otherwise, in those parts of the world where 
agricultural land cannot be increased except at an enormous cost, 
the family farm will tend to become progressively smaller.  Lewis 
commented on the case of Germany at the end of the 19th century, 
where the population was increasing at a rate of 1.2 percent per 
annum.  About half of the population at the time lived in urban 
areas.  The urban population grew at about 2.5 percent per annum 
thus absorbing the whole of the natural increase in population 
both from rural and urban areas.  Similarly in Latin America in 
recent decades, the rate of natural increase of population has 
been 3 percent per annum.  With an urbanisation rate of about 50 
percent, urban population has been rising at a rate of 6 percent 
per annum to absorb the entire natural increase of population.  
Thus the Latin American rural population remains constant while 
all the natural increase finds a living in urban areas.  This 
however does not happen in Asia because although the rate of 
growth of population is lower than in Latin America (say about 
2.5 percent), so is the rate of urbanisation (in the region of 25 
percent).  Thus if the Asian towns are to absorb the whole of the 
natural population increase, their population will have to grow 
at a rate of 10 percent per annum.  Lewis regarded this as 
impossible.  He pointed out that in a complex industrial system 
whose interdependent parts must grow in some sort of balance if 
profitability is to be retained, employment in manufacturing and 
mining cannot grow faster than at about 4 percent per annum. 
 
IV.5.  Contribution of Migration to City Growth 
 
Although the structural factors outlined above are the main 
reasons for rural-urban migration, other factors are also 
important.  Research shows that the latter include the economic 
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health of the urban economy, the mass media, the education system 
as well as government policies.
14
 
 
In the context of this discussion on rural urban migration it 
must be emphasized that, contrary to popular impression, 
migration is not the sole or even the most important cause of the 
enormous expansion of cities in the third world.  Research by the 
UN (1985) showed that between 1960 and 1970, in 26 large cities 
in 20 developing countries, 37 percent of population growth was 
due to migration and 63 percent to natural increase.  A main 
reason for this is likely to be the high urban birth rates in 
developing countries.  Oberai (1993) suggests that at an early 
stage of development, when levels of urbanisation are low and 
rates of both urban and rural natural increase are moderately 
high, net migration generally contributes more to urban 
population growth in LDCs than natural increase.  At an 
intermediate stage of urbanisation, natural increase 
predominates.  At a late stage, with high levels of urbanisation 
and low rates of natural increase, the relationship is more 
likely to be reversed again in favour of net migration. 
 
IV.6.  Operational Implications of the Structural Analysis 
 
What conclusions can we draw from the foregoing structural 
analysis of urbanisation and long-term growth of per capita 
incomes?  There are two implications which are particularly 
important. 
 
First, in view of the still large rural populations in Asia and 
Africa, there will continue to be a very large potential for 
rural-urban migration on these two developing continents.   
Secondly, a significant conceptual, as well as an important 
policy question for a developing country is what is the optimal 
degree of "de-ruralisation" (in the sense of a decline in the 
share of agriculture in output and employment) and rural-urban 
migration?  Are these processes occurring at too fast a pace or 
much too slowly?  Should economic policy be geared towards 
accelerating the decline in the share of agriculture or should it 
rather attempt to slow down the decline? 
 
A number of economists argue that, in general, the decline in 
agriculture's share in developing countries over recent decades 
has not proceeded fast enough in view of the large 
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underemployment of labour and the very low levels of productivity 
in that sector.  Others suggest-on the basis of the poor living 
conditions in many third world cities, with their slums and urban 
squalor-that de-ruralisation has been, if anything, too rapid.  
In view of its policy significance, the concept of the optimal 
degree of de-ruralisation requires precision. 
 
Following Singh's (1987,1989) definition of an efficient 
manufacturing sector in the context of the "de-industrialisation" 
of an advanced economy, Singh and Tabatabai (1993) conceptualize 
an "efficient" size and composition of the agricultural sector.  
From this they go on to suggest that the optimal degree and rate 
of de-ruralisation for a developing country is one which best 
enables it to achieve its overall long-term growth potential as 
well as meet the country's social objectives with respect to 
poverty alleviation, income distribution, and employment.  Thus, 
to illustrate, there was a big fall in the share of agriculture 
in Nigeria during the oil-boom decade, 1973-1983.  This was 
largely an indirect consequence of the rising exchange rate and 
other factors associated with the oil price rise (the "Dutch 
disease" syndrome).  In 1973 agricultural production accounted 
for 54 percent of GDP; by 1983 this share had fallen to 34 
percent as a result of both the rise in oil revenues and the 
attendant decline in agriculture, as resources were sucked away 
from the sector. 
 
In terms of the analytical scheme outlined above, such de-
ruralisation would be regarded as much too fast and inefficient, 
since most economists would agree that it has reduced the long-
term growth potential of the Nigerian economy as a whole (see, 
for example, Collier, 1988).  Over the same period in the 
Republic of Korea the share of agriculture in GDP fell from 35 to 
15 percent.  This even more rapid rate of de-ruralisation, 
however, may be regarded as having been efficient, since it did 
not undermine the long-term growth potential of the country's 
economy; it was also consistent with the alleviation of poverty 
and the creation of adequate  employment opportunities outside 
agriculture.  To make this conception of an optimal pace of de-
ruralisation for a country operational from a policy perspective 
would therefore require, inter alia, a careful analysis of 
agriculture's various contributions, including, in particular, 
its contribution to the balance of payments and to employment in 
the economy.   
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V. INDUSTRIALISATION OF THE SOUTH AND THE DEINDUSTRIALISATION 
OF THE NORTH 
 
In the light of this theoretical analysis, it is useful to 
consider the nature of the actual structural changes which have 
taken place in the North and in the South and their implications 
for their respective urban economies. 
 
The main impetus to structural change in the South in the postwar 
period has been the desire of developing countries to 
industrialize rapidly to catch up with the rich countries.  
Consequently, following the end of the second world war, a large 
number of third world countries embarked on a veritable 
industrial revolution - a revolution that they had been prevented 
from implementing fifty or a hundred years earlier by the rather 
different world economic and political conditions.  With their 
political independence and with the new world economic 
conjuncture that prevailed in the post-war period, most poor 
countries initiated a serious process of industrialisation and, 
particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, several of them made 
rapid industrial progress.  Even developing countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, which started with extremely unfavourable initial 
conditions when colonial rule ended, managed to increase their 
share of world manufacturing production during these two decades. 
 More significantly, a group of nations in Asia and Latin America 
- the so-called newly industrializing countries - were especially 
successful in establishing a technical, scientific and industrial 
infrastructure, in training their labour forces and in developing 
a relatively broad based industrial structure.  By the 1970s 
these countries were providing formidable competition to the 
North in a range of consumer and producer goods industries.
15
  
 
As a consequence of this industrialisation, the third world's 
share of world industrial production and world manufactured 
exports has increased appreciably over the last four decades.  
More importantly from the perspective of the present discussion, 
the productive structures of developing economies have 
significantly changed during this period. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 provide evidence on changes in the structures of 
employment and output respectively in different regions of the 
world economy.  Table 5 indicates that the share of agriculture 
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in total production in developing countries halved between 1960 
and 1990 - from more than 30 percent to a little over 15 percent. 
 There was a sizeable drop in every region, including Africa 
where agriculture's share fell from a little over 45 percent to 
about 30 percent over this period.  
 
Turning to manufacturing, for the South as a whole, the share of 
manufacturing in GDP increased by 5 percentage points between 
1960 and 1990, from 15.6 percent to 20.7 percent.  There were, 
however, important regional variations: the South and Southeast 
Asian countries' share increased by 9 percentage points (to reach 
a figure of nearly 23 percent) indicating their relatively faster 
pace of industrialisation; the African countries share nearly 
doubled to almost 11 percent in 1990, but their starting point 
was very low.  The Latin American countries which were the most 
industrialised among the developing economies at the beginning of 
the period have hardly recorded any increase at all in the share 
of manufacturing over these three decades.  This is essentially 
due to two reasons: (a) the share of manufacturing in GDP in 
Latin American countries in 1960 was already high, being over 20 
percent and (b) as we shall see in the next section, Latin 
America industry suffered a severe setback in the 1980s.  As a 
result, the share of manufacturing in GDP fell during that 
decade.  In all developing regions in table 5, there was an 
appreciable increase in the share of services. 
 
Despite the important progress registered by the third world 
industry in the last three to four decades, the bottom half of 
the table shows that over 60 percent of the third world's labour 
force is still employed in agriculture.  There has, nevertheless, 
been a marked change in the employment structure of the labour 
force in these economies over the last quarter century along the 
lines predicted by the theoretical analysis of section IV.  The 
pace of change in the structure of employment has however been 
much slower than in that of output. 
 
 
The top part of tables 5 and 6 provide corresponding information 
on structural changes in employment and output in industrial 
countries.  These show deindustrialisation in the sense of 
sizeable declines in the share of manufacturing in both output 
and employment in these countries over the three decades 1960-
1990.  Although there are obviously very important inter-country 
variations, the average share of manufacturing in GDP for the 
aggregate of industrial countries is now about the same as that 
for developing countries taken together - a little over 20 
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percent.  Yet 30 years ago manufacturing's share of GDP was on 
average twice as high for industrial countries as for developing 
countries.  
 
Similarly, table 6 indicates for advanced countries a large fall 
in the share of industry in total employment over the quarter 
century 1965-1990.  These aggregate figures however conceal the 
extent of job losses in industry suffered by leading individual 
industrial countries; the latter have been the source of public 
disquiet about deindustrialisation in these nations.  UNCTAD 
(1995) data for the G-7 economies show that not only the share of 
industrial employment in total employment fell in most countries, 
but there was also a huge fall in the absolute numbers employed 
in manufacturing in a number of countries, particularly in 
Europe.  Thus, in the UK there were 7.9 million manufacturing 
workers in 1970; by 1993 this number had fallen to 4.3 million, a 
shrinkage of 45 percent.  In France, the corresponding figure was 
23 percent, in Germany 14 percent and the average for the G-7 
industrial countries was a fall of 15 percent.  Japanese 
industrial employment actually slightly increased over this 
period. 
 
The above differences in the nature of structural changes 
experienced by economies in the North and the South go some way 
towards explaining the differences which were noted earlier with 
respect to urbanisation patterns in the two groups of countries. 
 The fast growth in the size of large cities in the poor 
countries is due both to greater manufacturing and service 
employment as well as to reduced employment in agriculture.  In 
the North, large cities
16
 have been losing population in part 
because of deindustrialisation and specifically the disappearance 
of older smokestack industries which had an important place in 
many of these cities.     
 
VI.  THE POST-1979 GLOBAL ECONOMIC CHANGES AND THE URBAN ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH 
 
VI.1.  Economic Policy Changes in the North and their Impact on 
the South 
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The end of the 1970s witnessed far-reaching changes in the 
domestic macroeconomic policies of industrial countries.  These 
changes were heralded by the appointment of Paul Volcker as the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in the United States in 
1979.  Following the second oil price increase, the United States 
government embarked on a highly contractionary monetary and 
fiscal policy.  These policies were later emulated either 
willingly (as for example in the case of the UK) or unwillingly 
(through a process of competitive deflation) by other industrial 
countries (e.g., France).  The net result was a prolonged 
recession between 1979 and 1983 in the advanced countries and an 
unprecedented rise in international money and real interest 
rates.  
 
As a consequence of the developments in the North, the third 
world countries, at the beginning of the 1980s, were subjected to 
a series of unprecedented external shocks.  Equally 
significantly, a number of these adverse factors have continued 
to operate throughout the decade (and into the 1990s), which has 
made economic recovery in many poor countries extremely 
difficult. 
 
The most important channels through which these changes in 
economic policy and the slow-down in the North's and hence in 
world economic activity (as the North accounts for about 80 
percent of the total output of the world's market economies) 
affected economic and industrial development in the third world 
countries were the following: (a) a reduction in the demand for 
third world products, including commodity and mineral exports; 
(b) as a consequence of (a), a fall in commodity prices and hence 
adverse movements in the terms of trade; (c) an increase in the 
real burden of interest and debt service payments, partly due to 
(a) and (b) and partly due to an enormous increase in interest 
rates; (d) a reduction in the quantum of aid and other capital 
flows.
17
 
 
 
VI.2.  Inter-Continental and Inter-Sectoral Differences in 
Economic Performance 
 
However, the external shocks did not effect all developing 
countries equally; nor was their effect uniform.  There were 
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striking  inter-regional differences.  Table 7, which provides 
data on comparative sectoral (agricultural and industrial) and 
overall economic  performance of the developing economies during 
the last quarter century, shows that there was a trend fall in 
their rate of growth of GDP in the 1980s, compared with the 
period 1965-1980, from 5.9 percent to 3.2 percent per annum.  
However, the table also reveals that this was mainly an 
aggregation effect caused by the collapse of economic growth in 
the Latin American and Sub-Saharan African countries in the later 
period, i.e. in the 1980s.  By contrast, both the East and the 
South Asian countries not only maintained their momentum of 
economic expansion in the last decade, but indeed recorded a 
trend increase in their growth rates.  The rise in the growth 
rate was particularly significant for the Indian as well as the 
Chinese economies. 
 
Table 7 also shows that, although in the pre-1980 period the East 
Asian countries grew somewhat faster than their Latin American 
counterparts, the difference in the growth rates was relatively 
small (7.3 percent per annum for the former as against 6 percent 
per annum for the latter during 1965-1980).  However, the Latin 
American growth rate in this earlier period was considerably 
faster than that of the South Asian economies, so that the 
average rate of economic growth for all countries together on the 
two continents was broadly similar before the debt crisis of the 
1980s. 
 
Both groups of Asian economies in Table 7 recorded a trend 
increase in their agricultural growth rates during the 1980s.  
However, although the agricultural performance of Asia was 
superior to that of the other two developing continents, the main 
reason for the overall economic failure in Latin America and Sub-
Saharan Africa in the recent period lay in their extremely poor 
industrial record.  In the 1980s, industry expanded at a rate of 
over 10 percent per annum in the East Asian countries, and at a 
rate  of over 6 percent in the South Asian countries.  The 
corresponding industrial growth rate in Latin America was only 
0.7 percent per annum. 
 
In order to assess the impact of the differential overall 
economic performance on the average standard of living of the 
people on the three continents, the GDP growth rate figures in 
Table 7 have to be adjusted for the rate of growth of population, 
terms of trade and net factor payments abroad.  These adjustments 
indicate that during the last decade per capita income in Sub-
Saharan African countries fell by as much as 25 percent and in 
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Latin America by 15 percent.  However, the Asian countries 
average per capita income was a little over 50 percent higher at 
the end of the decade than at the beginning (United Nations, 
1990). 
 
VI.3.  Impact on Modern Sector Employment 
 
A major consequence of these inter-continental and inter-sectoral 
differences in economic performance in the 1980s has been a 
deepening crisis of the urban economy and society particularly in 
Latin America.  The contrast in this respect between the fast-
growing industrial economies of the developing countries in East 
and South-East Asia and the industrial failure in Latin America 
could not be more striking.  In the  former group of countries, 
faster industrial growth has led to rising real wages as well as 
increasing employment, particularly in the modern sector (see 
Table 8 for changes in real earnings in manufacturing in 
different developing regions over the last two decades).  The 
opposite has been true of the stagnating Latin American economies 
in the 1980s and even into the 1990s. 
 
The World Employment Report for 1995 summarizes these 
developments for the successful Asian countries: 
 
* total employment grew rapidly in the 1980s, with a marked 
acceleration in the latter half of the decade.  The growth 
rates ranged from 2.3 percent in Hong Kong to 5.9 percent in 
Singapore; 
 
* as a result, unemployment fell between the mid-1980s and the 
early 1990s.  The unemployment rates in the latter period 
were extremely low, ranging from 2.0 to 2.7 percent; 
  
* in some countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and 
China, labour shortages emerged and there was  significant 
immigration of labour from neighbouring lower-income 
countries; 
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* employment growth was spearheaded by the manufacturing 
sector.  Manufacturing employment grew at a rate of over 6 
percent per annum during the 1980s for the dynamic economies 
of the region; 
 
* as a result, the structure of employment continued to shift 
to manufacturing and other high-productivity activities in 
the modern sector rising from about 7 percent of total 
employment in 1960 to around 18 percent by 1994.  This 
presented growing opportunities for those in low-
productivity activities to move into better modern-sector 
jobs, thereby sharing in the gains from growth; 
 
* at the same time real earnings grew steadily, with the rate 
of growth averaging a little over 5 percent per annum during 
the 1980s; 
 
*  the combined effect of these developments was a steady 
decline in levels of poverty and the region's noteworthy 
performance in terms of an equitable distribution of income. 
 Indeed, an international cross-section of countries showing 
the proportion of people under a given poverty line and 
their relative per capita mean consumption level suggests 
that East and South-East Asia, with a per capita consumption 
level around 26 percent lower than Latin America and the 
Caribbean in 1990, had, nevertheless, half the proportion of 
people living under the common poverty line: in 1990, around 
15 percent of the population in East and South-East Asia 
lived under the poverty line compared with 59 percent in 
South Asia, 54 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 28 percent 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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The same Report's summary of the corresponding situation with 
respect to employment and real wages in the Latin American 
economies is given below. 
 
* there was a steady fall in modern-sector employment between 
1980 and 1992, with paid employment falling at a rate of 
about 0.1 percent per annum during the 1980s.  This reversed 
the trend of the previous three decades, when steady 
economic growth had led to a significant  expansion of 
modern-sector employment; 
 
* over the same period the share of employment in the urban 
informal sector increased from 13.4 percent of the labour 
force to 18.6 percent; 
 
* in most countries the average real wage (across all sectors) 
fell during the 1980s, recovering in only a few countries 
towards the end of the decade.  The extent of the decline 
varied across sectors, ranging from 5 percent in industry to 
20 percent in agriculture.  The minimum wage was also 
estimated to have fallen by an average of 24 percent in real 
terms across the region, while average earnings in the 
informal sector declined even more sharply (by 42 percent). 
 
With respect to Sub-Saharan Africa, the Report notes that instead 
of rapid industrial development, there was a collapse of the 
modern sector in many Sub-Saharan countries.  The negative 
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consequences of this for employment in the region are plain from 
the following facts: 
 
* there is strong evidence of a substantial decline in modern-
sector employment since the mid-1980s in countries which 
experienced a sharp fall in GDP growth.  Paid employment in 
manufacturing declined at a rate of 0.5 percent per annum 
during the 1980s.  This decline was especially severe in 
Ghana (by over half), Benin, and Niger.  In contrast, in 
countries such as Botswana and Mauritius which experienced 
the highest GDP growth in the 1980s, modern-sector 
employment continued to expand; 
 
* rural-to-urban migration remained high.  This, together with 
the decline in modern-sector employment, led to an expansion 
of low-productivity urban informal-sector activities.  On 
average, the informal sector is now believed to employ over 
60 percent of the urban labour force; 
 
* urban unemployment has increased and now ranges between 15 
and 20 percent compared to around 10 percent in the mid-
1970s; 
 
* real wages in manufacturing fell sharply throughout the 
1980s.  Of the 15 countries for which data are available, 
real wages fell in 12.  The mean rate of decline was 12.3 
percent per annum during the 1980s. 
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Turning to the North, the effects of the post-1979 changes in 
economic policies in industrial countries on their own urban 
economies have been profound. These effects have been referred to 
earlier in the discussion of de-industrialisation; they will be 
taken up further in the analysis below on globalisation and of 
the informal sector.  Suffice it is to note here that, as in the 
case of Latin American cities, the first world cities have also 
experienced growing informalisation of the labour market, low 
wages for the unskilled and increased deprivation for the bottom 
quarter of the population. 
 
 
VII. GLOBALISATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIES NORTH AND SOUTH 
 
An outstanding feature of the world economy during the recent 
period has been "globalisation", a term which normally connotes 
three things: (a) freer trade between countries in goods and 
services; (b) freer movements of financial capital as well as (c) 
removal of restrictions on direct foreign investment.  The 
globalisation process started in advanced countries with the 
deregulation of financial markets in the late 1970s.  It gathered 
pace in the 1980s with the virtual abolition of exchange control 
among most industrial countries (Cosh, Hughes and Singh 1992).  
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In the 1990s, liberalisation of financial markets has become a 
world wide phenomenon, and it now involves a large number of 
developing countries as well  (Singh, 1995a).  For a variety of 
reasons, this external liberalisation has gone hand in hand with 
internal liberalisation, particularly of labour markets in many 
countries.  The whole process has been given further impetus by 
the recently concluded Uruguay Round Agreements, which provide 
for freer trade, not just in manufactures but also in agriculture 
and service. 
  
The important question in the context of this paper is how would 
globalisation, which basically represents the supremacy of market 
forces, affect cities and urban prospects in the North and the 
South.  It is conventional wisdom among economists to welcome 
liberalisation of the world economy as a positive force which 
will lead to greater trade, greater productivity, more jobs and 
higher wages.  This is, however, not a perception shared by the 
ordinary public in most countries in the North and in many 
countries in the South. 
 
Workers, trade unionists and the general public in industrial 
countries increasingly blame cheap labour products from 
developing economies for their job losses or for their stagnant 
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real incomes.  So, unlike the 1950s and 1960s, when free trade 
with advanced countries was feared by developing countries, today 
it is the former who are more concerned about the ill effects of 
a liberal trading regime.  These concerns were epitomised by Ross 
Perot and Pat Choate in their condemnation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement with Mexico as "drastic and unfair 
scheme...(which) will pit American and Mexican workers in a race 
to the bottom".  Hence in many advanced countries there are 
populist demands for protection from third world imports.  These 
often take the form of asking for the imposition of labour or 
environmental standards on Third World products. 
 
It was seen earlier that the labour markets of the North have 
been dominated by two important tendencies namely: a) de-
industrialisation and b) high overall unemployment.  In addition, 
there is evidence of increasing inequality between skilled and 
unskilled workers, particularly in the U.S.  In defiance of 
conventional wisdom, Adrian Wood (1994) has argued in an 
important recent book that all these tendencies have been caused 
by globalisation, in the shape of intense competition from 
developing countries, in less skill-intensive products.  Wood's 
conclusions are, however, controversial. 
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The countries of the South have their own reservations about the 
liberalisation process.  They are, for example, concerned that 
the Uruguay Round Agreements have extended multilateral rules and 
disciplines to a number of policy areas affecting industrial 
development.  The net result would be to circumscribe their 
domestic policy autonomy, and particularly their ability to use 
industrial policies to foster exports and to achieve rapid 
structural changes and economic growth - as was done in the past 
by the highly successful East Asian economies.  Developing 
countries, are also similarly worried by the economic instability 
which free capital movements engender.  
 
The record so far of the market supremacy model and the 
liberalised world economy has not been particularly inviting. The 
world trend rate of economic growth between 1980 and 1995 has 
been about half of what it experienced between 1960 and 1973 
(rightly regarded as the Golden Age), when it was subject to 
extensive regulation.  Moreover, the earlier period wasse ised by 
more or less full employment in industrial countries, whilst the 
 Allrtcent period has been plighted by mass unemployment.  In 
addition, the world economy has been much more unstable in the 
market supremacy period than it was in the Golden Age. 
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Whether or not all the ill effects, feared by the critics of 
liberalisation, materialize, one thing is clear: both the 
national and the world economies will display greater instability 
and be subjected to greater external economic shocks than before. 
 The cities and towns, North and South, will have to learn to 
live with these shocks.  If the proponents of globalisation are 
right, there would be compensation in the form of faster growth 
and more jobs.  But at this point, it is very much an open 
question whether or not these favourable outcomes will actually 
come about. 
 
Finally, it may be useful to comment on Krugman's (1995) formal 
model of new economic geography, from which he derives 
implications for the effects of globalisation on the sizes of 
large third world cities.  Krugman's model analyses agglomeration 
effects arising from the interactions among market size, 
transportation cost and increasing returns at the firm level.  
The model suggests that globalisation may reduce the size of 
primate cities in developing countries.  The basic intuition here 
is that free trade reduces the economies of agglomeration while 
leaving the centrifugal forces (ie. diseconomies of 
agglomeration) much as before.  This is because trade permits 
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firms to sell abroad, thus reducing their need to be close to the 
domestic market. 
 
However, as Isserman (1995) points out in his comment on 
Krugman's model, the model is too simple in that it excludes 
agriculture and the countryside as well as other important 
variables.  For example, trade liberalisation may destroy 
domestic agriculture and thus increase rural-urban migration, 
leading to an increase in the city size, a conclusion opposite to 
what Krugman suggests. 
 
 
VIII   THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION AND CITIES 
 
It is widely believed that the world is undergoing a new, far 
reaching technical revolution as a result of the rise and spread 
of information technology.  Professor Freeman (1989) has argued 
that the "information and communication technology paradigm" 
presently sweeping the globe is as important in terms of its 
spillover effects and overall economic impact as any of the three 
major technological revolutions of the past two centuries.  He 
identifies them as being based: firstly, on a cluster of textile 
innovations (approximately 1770-1830); secondly, on railways 
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(approximately 1840-1890); and thirdly, on electricity, the 
internal combustion engine and the chemical industry 
(approximately 1890-1930). 
 
The revolution in information and communications technology (ICT) 
involves a constellation of industries, such as computers, 
electronic components and telecommunications.  These are among 
the fastest-growing industries in most leading industrial 
countries.  The new technology has not only resulted in the 
introduction of a wide range of new products but, more 
importantly, has produced a drastic fall in costs and vastly 
improved technical performance in many other sectors of the 
economy.  Of equal significance, the new technology is bringing 
about fundamental changes in the organization and structure of 
firms and industries, and changes in factory lay-out and in the 
management structure, procedures and attitudes of large firms. 
 
The essential question raised by this technological and 
organisational revolution in the present context, is whether and 
to what extent it is responsible for the phenomenon of mass 
unemployment in industrial countries and the huge under-
employment in many third world cities today.  Has the pace of 
technological progress become so fast that we are observing 
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jobless growth - e.g. economic growth does not create any 
employment at all, or in a less extreme form, the hypothesis 
would be that a given percentage change in economic growth leads 
to a smaller increase in employment than it used to be the csasof 
either of these hypotheses. Available data show that productivity 
growth, whether measured in terms of labour, capital, or total 
factor productivity, has fallen in the post-Golden Age period in 
every leading industrial country as well as in most developing 
regions, compared with the Golden Age (UN, 1995).  This suggests 
that at least at the aggregate level, an acceleration in the rate 
of technical progress could not be regarded as a cause of rising 
unemployment.  For if the rate of technical progress had become 
faster in the recent period, productivity growth would have 
increased rather than fallen.  Similarly there is no evidence to 
indicate that the employment elasticity of output has fallen 
compared with before: if anything, at the aggregate level, its 
value in the recent period is greater than in the Golden Age.  
The reason why there is more unemployment now is not because 
economic growth does not create jobs, but is simply that the OECD 
and the world economies are expanding at a slower rate than 
before. 
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In short, what available evidence suggests is that the full 
potential of the new technological revolution is not being 
harnessed because of the slow growth of world demand and output. 
 
Apart from its implications for urban employment, another 
important issue with respect to the information and 
communications technology is its possible impact on 'economies of 
agglomeration'. Will it, for example, tend to erode those 
economies and thereby reduce the comparative advantage of large 
primate cities. There is no firm evidence on this subject but the 
general view seems to be that it is unlikely to have a serious 
impact on the advantages offered by large cities, particularly in 
the third world. Even in the case of the first world, the recent 
Economist's Survey of the cities observed:
18
 
 
 "Silicon Valleys are likely to remain the exception rather 
than the rule, because the advantages of concentration will 
usually be greater in one large city than in a string of 
towns.......  In practice, the sheer variety of skills gives 
cities an edge over towns. In a city, an employer can find 
every possible combination of skill, age and background. 
When the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
set up in London in 1991, it needed people from 38 different 
countries speaking more than 50 languages, as well as 
                     
    
18
  Economist (1995). 
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experts in banking, economics, law, administration and so 
on. Three-quarters of those it eventually recruited were 
already living in London." 
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 PART 3 
 
In order to gain a fuller understanding of the role of the cities 
and their ability to create adequate job opportunities now and in 
the future requires a discussion of certain other important 
issues which are the subject of this part of the paper. The 
following topics will be reviewed:  the role of the labour 
markets and that of the informal sector; the question of 
economies of agglomeration and optimum city size; the 
environmental degradation of the cities and the question of a 
possible trade-off between environment and employment. 
 
All of these are big subjects. However, our purpose here is not 
to summarise the literature in each area, but rather to bring out 
the issues which are salient to policy, particularly with respect 
to employment and unemployment. Again, where appropriate, the 
differences in the analyses of these issues for developing and 
developed countries will be high-lighted. 
 
 
IX   THE URBAN LABOUR MARKETS AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR: THE NORTH 
AND THE SOUTH 
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IX.1  The South 
 
Combining together the traditional notion of economic dualism in 
the development literature with that of segmented labour markets 
from modern labour economics, many researchers have found it 
useful to discuss the labour markets in the developing countries 
in terms of the so-called 'informal' and formal sectors. The 
former usually refers to 'unprotected' jobs outside the preview 
of labour legislation on minimum wages, health, safety and other 
benefits. Many of these jobs are casual, insecure and irregular. 
Informal sector employment also includes 'marginal activities' 
such as hawking, shoe-shining or domestic service. The ILO has 
been a leader in sponsoring or carrying out empirical studies of 
the labour markets in developing countries. For recent reviews of 
ILO's work in this area and new studies of labour markets, see 
among others Rodgers(1989), Oberai(1993), Standing(1995).  
 
The most important analytical and policy issues which arise in 
relation to the third world labour markets and the informal 
sector are listed below. 
 
 a. How perfectly or imperfectly do labour markets in the 
 third world work?  Specifically, are market imperfections 
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 and other rigidities responsible for the rising 
 unemployment and underemployment in many developing 
 countries during the last decade? 
  
 b. Does the informal sector make a genuine contribution 
 to employment?  Or, does it simply represent low-
 productivity disguised unemployment, arising from the 
non-availability or the destruction of formal sector jobs as 
 a consequence of economic depression? 
 
On (a) there is a wealth of evidence on segmentation and 
imperfections in the urban labour markets in developing 
countries.  For identical occupations, there are likely to exist 
large wage differentials within the same city. There is 
discrimination on the basis of sex, age, ethnic origin and there 
exist many barriers to entry for jobs in the formal sector. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that although labour 
markets in developing countries may be imperfect in the static 
sense, from a dynamic perspective, they seem to work very well. 
It was seen in section VI that in countries in Latin America and 
Africa where GDP growth collapsed in the 1980s and their demand 
for labour fell, there were huge declines in real wages. 
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Similarly, in the East-Asian countries, faster growth of 
production and the increased demand for labour in the recent 
period led to appreciable real wage rises. Available evidence 
flatly contradicts the view that the rise in urban unemployment 
and underemployment in Latin American or the African countries 
has been due to inflexible labour markets. These countries have 
experienced gigantic falls in real wages over the relevant 
period.(see table 8). 
 
Turning to the informal sector, there are conceptual distinctions 
which are important. informal sector can expand for any of 
the following reasons. 
 
 (1) There is a general rise in economic activity, which 
involves both the formal as well as the informal 
sectors. However, if the rate of growth of economic 
activity accelerates beyond a certain point (say 6 to 8 
per cent, as has happened in the East-Asian economies), 
the formal sector may expand at the expense of the 
informal sector. 
 
 (2) There is a collapse in economic growth and a 
shrinkage of the formal sector. In the absence of a 
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publicly provided social safety net, workers will be 
obliged to accept any jobs in the informal sector, 
howsoever non-remunerative or unproductive they may be. 
In these circumstances, the informal sector expands at 
the expense of the formal sector. This has been the 
situation in many Latin American and African countries, 
particularly during the 1980s. 
  
 (3) However, the informal sector can also expand for 
totally different reasons which are unconnected with 
the growth of the economy. Here the proximate cause may 
be tax evasion, or onerous rules and regulations which 
lead to the expansion of the black or the unregistered 
economies. 
 
The appropriate policy towards the informal sector would clearly 
be different in each of these circumstances. Therefore, it is 
important to empirically distinguish between these different 
cases although in practice it is not always easy to do so.  
 
IX.2  The North 
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The expansion of the informal sector has not only been a 
characteristic of the third world economies, but has increasingly 
become a feature, in the 1980s, of the urban labour markets in 
industrial countries as well.  This has both been due to a trend 
decline in the rate of growth of GDP in these countries, as well 
as the government measures in many of them, to role back the 
welfare state and to increase labour market flexibility.  
 
Eatwell (1995) and UNCTAD (1995) have formalized the concept of 
disguised unemployment and estimated its empirical significance  
for a group of leading advanced countries.  They postulate a 
segmented labour market: in the high productivity, high wage 
sector, the level of employment is determined by aggregate 
demand, while in the low productivity, low wage sector employment 
is determined by the supply of labour to that sector.  If there 
is a fall in aggregate demand leading to layoffs in the former 
sector, in the absence of a social safety net, the latter sector 
would act as a perfect sponge for displaced workers.  Measured 
employment in that case will become independent of aggregate 
demand.  This, UNCTAD (1995) suggests, "is the full-employment 
that would be attained with a highly flexible labour market."  
Empirical estimates of disguised unemployment indicate that if it 
is added to open unemployment, "true" unemployment is much higher 
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than measured unemployment in the US and Japan.  These estimates 
show that corrected for disguised unemployment, the true 
unemployment rates have tended to converge among the leading 
industrial countries in the 1980s. 
 
X. ECONOMIES OF AGGLOMERATION AND THE "OPTIMAL CITY SIZE" 
 
X.1 Economies of Agglomeration  
 
The main reason why  manufacturing industry flocks to urban areas 
is the economies of agglomeration. These economies are important 
both analytically and from the policy perspective since they 
highlight the difficulties developing countries face in any 
programme of a more equitable spatial distribution of population. 
The agglomeration economies, particularly in a large third world 
metropolis, take several forms, the most significant of which are 
listed below. 
 
 (a) Infrastructure for modern industry: electricity, 
telecommunications, airports etc. These are extremely 
expensive facilities which for poor countries are 
difficult to provide except in one or two locations. 
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 (b) Specialised business services, including 
consulting, financial offices and so on. All these 
activities are essential for modern industry and 
business and require a minimum population size for 
their profitable operation. 
 
 (c) Thick labour markets, i.e. the availability of 
labour with a wide variety of skills. 
 
 (d) The important role of externalities as well as of 
the economies of scale. The large scale operations of 
firms leads to lower costs and better services which in 
turn improves the operations of other firms who 
purchase these inputs and services. This process 
generates an organic virtuous circle of expanding 
markets and increased technical change. 
 
 (e) Large city provides the focus of interaction for 
the intellectual, business, cultural, political and 
religious elites. 
 
X.2  The "Optimal City Size" 
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In view of the economies of scale and agglomeration outlined 
above, the question arises whether diseconomies set in beyond a 
certain city size. Is there an optimal size of the city? There 
clearly are manifest diseconomies arising from congestion, 
enormous traffic jams, environmental pollution, etc. in any large 
metropolis in the Third World. However, there does not appear to 
be an optimum unique city size.
19
 Southern cities like Mexico 
City, Sao Paulo, Seoul, Bombay are reaching population sizes not 
previously attained by cities in developed countries, except 
Tokyo. In view of the fact that Tokyo is probably one of the best 
run cities on the planet with well functioning social services, 
relatively little crime, etc. it will be difficult to argue that 
Tokyo's population of 25 million is too large, or is not optimal. 
 
X.3 Trade Off Between Equity and Efficiency  
 
A very important policy question for third world governments is 
whether a more equitable spatial distribution of modern 
activities can be obtained by dispersing them from large cities 
to smaller towns and indeed rural areas. This may clearly be 
equitable, but all the evidence indicates that the dispersal is 
                     
    
19
 See World Bank (1979), Cohen (1976), Oberai (1993). 
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unlikely to be efficient. This is for two reasons; a) the 
economies of agglomeration, and equally importantly, for 
developing countries, b) the huge costs of development of the 
necessary infrastructure and facilities elsewhere other than in a 
few large cities. 
 
This is not to deny that some industries and modern service 
activities could not profitably be shifted from large to smaller 
cities or even to rural market towns. However, because of the 
infrastructural costs and the economies of agglomeration, the 
scope for such decentralisation on efficiency grounds alone is 
much more limited in the developing than in developed countries. 
 
 
X.4 Structural Differences Between the Third World and the First 
World Cities 
 
The essential difference between the two groups of cities lies in 
the fact that the Third World cities are subject to what may be 
called "expanding urbanisation" whilst those in the industrial 
countries are experiencing "mature urbanisation". In the latter 
case, instead of an increase in size, the large cities are often 
losing population to smaller cities. One important reason for 
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this is that unlike developing countries, the smaller cities in 
advanced countries already possess the necessary infrastructure 
for modern business activity. Thus when the diseconomies due to 
congestion, higher rents or transportation inconveniences become 
too large in the big cities, there is a movement of people or 
businesses to smaller cities or suburbs. Thus in mature 
urbanisation, city-to-city migration is the main factor affecting 
the system of cities. The determinants of city-to-city migration 
are rather different from those of rural-urban migration 
experienced by the third world cities.  
 
Moreover, in advanced countries there are rather different 
demographic, technological and other factors which will affect 
the future shape of the large cities. To illustrate, in the 
foreseeable future the dominant demographic trend in these 
countries will be the growth of the retired and the aged 
population. The tastes and preferences of these people, many of 
whom are likely to be relatively well off(living on various forms 
of index-linked pensions) will have a profound influence on the 
future development of the large cities and of the urban system as 
a whole. Similarly growth in leisure spending of the population 
is likely to be a major factor in shaping the economic activities 
of cities and in determining their place in the urban hierarchy. 
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XI   ENVIRONMENT AND THE CITIES: THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH 
 
XI.1  The South 
 
The cities, North and South, as suggested in earlier sections, 
suffer from serious environmental degradation. The problem is, 
however, particularly acute in developing countries. Not only are 
the world's largest cities increasingly to be found in the third 
world, so also are the world's dirtiest and the most polluted. In 
many large third world cities, the water and the air quality 
often do not meet the minimum standards for healthy living. 
 
Yet there is a paradox. People keep leaving the environmentally, 
relatively more friendly, rural areas to flock to the cities. The 
major reason clearly is that large cities do provide more job 
opportunities than small towns or the countryside. A whole range 
of job-creating auxiliary service activities - cafes, 
restaurants, cinema houses - spring up to serve the needs of 
manufacturing or modern service industry firms which may be 
attracted to large cities by economies of scale and 
agglomeration. 
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The dispersal of economic activities from the large cities may 
not only be useful from the point of view of equity, but may also 
be crucial for the environment. However, as noted above, the 
economies of agglomeration and the high costs of infrastructure 
forbid this course of action for most poor countries. 
  
The costs involved in environmental improvements in large cities 
in developing countries are perhaps best summed up by the 
following thought experiment suggested by Olpadwala and Goldsmith 
(1992): 
 
 Consider what it would cost to provide every household 
and industry in Sao Paulo or Bombay with hook-ups for 
municipal sewage treatment. (Sao Paulo is a city of 
about 18 million people with only 16% of its households 
and some industries connected to treatment plants; 
Bombay has nine million, with most of its effluent 
untreated.) What would it cost for all large Third 
World cities? Few dare make such estimates. Analysts 
hesitate in part because of the known magnitudes for 
cases in the industrialised world. For example, the 60 
municipalities of the Boston metropolitan area, with 
about three million people, are now under order from a 
US federal court to treat their sewage, almost all of 
which is dumped, untreated, into the harbour. 
Fortunately, household and industrial hook-ups are 
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already in place, and the drainage system is adequate. 
The court order does not require construction of 
tertiary treatment facilities which would be required 
to turn the effluent into water of drinking quality. 
All Boston needs under the court order to do is to 
build facilities for primary and secondary treatment 
and a single pipe eight miles out into the ocean. The 
cost: more than US $6 billion, or about $5 thousand per 
household. 
 
 It is staggering to translate these costs into 
Brazilian cruzeiros, Indian rupees, or Nigerian nairas. 
 
What this analysis suggests is that for poor countries, with 
large cities, in order to create jobs and raise per capita 
incomes, unhealthy environment may be a necessary cost to bear 
for a long time. This is not a new situation. Even rich cities 
like London were environmentally unhealthy until about fifty 
years ago. Then the Clean Air Act and other related measures made 
the city much more environmentally friendly, although some argue 
that under the weight of the motor car, London is now reverting 
back to its old self.  
 
None of the above is to suggest that third world cities should 
ignore the environment. They need to keep fully informed about 
the environmental degradation and the research on the latest 
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technological developments to overcome these difficulties. The 
cities may also be able to implement smaller environmental 
projects to the extent that these can be afforded. But, the 
leaders of the cities should, nevertheless, not lose sight of the 
fact that there may be a possible trade-off between the growth of 
output and employment and the improvement of the environment. 
 
 
XI.2 The North 
 
Advanced countries are not, however, confronted by such cruel 
environmental dilemmas. Their cities are rich enough to afford 
substantial environmental improvements without being obliged to 
sacrifice growth- and even to the extent that growth rate has to 
be reduced, they are sufficiently well off to be able to bear the 
burden. There are however serious environmental problems in the 
Northern cities. Many of these are caused by the motor car. The 
cities need to use the latest research, new technologies and bold 
experimentation to cope with these problems. Can the car be made 
to meet the needs of cities and their people rather than the 
other way round as it is now? Thus Richard Rogers (1995):  
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 The car is perhaps the century's most liberating 
technological product. On the face of it, the car is 
cheap, practical and promises freedom and status. 
Simple logistics show how increase in car ownership 
transforms the city. Public space is taken over by 
parked cars. An efficient parking standard requires 20 
square meters for a single car. If only one in ten 
citizens owns a car, in a city of ten million people, 
you need an area twice the size of central London, just 
to park their cars. Start up those million cars, and 
drive off, and you saturate the city with pollution and 
congestion. Just the anticipation of high levels of car 
use has made city planners design new cities around 
road specifications, ignoring most other human needs. 
The tail is wagging the dog. 
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 Part 4. 
 
This part of the paper turns to policy. It examines policy 
approaches to the problems and dilemmas outlined in the previous 
sections in relation particularly to the cities in the South. 
Many of the policy proposals to be outlined here are implicit in 
the conceptual and empirical analysis of the previous sections; 
these will now be more explicitly stated and examined. 
 
Section XII Urban Employment in the North and the South: 
Proposals for Policy Action 
 
XII.1 Policy Focus 
 
Cities as we have seen face a wide range of problems but in order 
to keep the policy discussion focused, this part will concentrate 
on the present and future prospects for employment in cities and 
towns.  
 
The employment question is directly linked to that of the 
reduction of poverty. At the microeconomic level a reasonably 
remunerative job will keep a family out of poverty. At the 
macroeconomic level, the relationship between the two, even 
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though indirect, is equally close. Just as the creation of 
sufficient employment opportunities requires a reasonable rate of 
economic growth, so does the eradication of poverty and meeting 
the minimum basic needs of the people.
20
 
 
Although, at any one time, a redistribution of national output 
may enable a society to better meet the basic needs of its 
people, on a longer term basis such needs can only be met if 
there is an expansion of the national economy. Economic growth 
generates increased employment and household incomes; equally 
importantly, it increases government revenues, which may be spent 
on health, education, clean water supplies, and other basic needs 
of the people. 
 
Part 2 of the paper showed that during the last 15 years, those 
economies (mainly in Asia) that were able to achieve  high rates 
of growth have succeeded in significantly reducing poverty.  
These countries have also had high rates of growth of real wages 
and employment. On the other hand, low economic growth in the 
Latin American and African countries in the recent period has had 
                     
    
20
  For the relationship between employment, basic needs, 
poverty and economic growth, see Singh (1979, 1992b). See also ILO 
(1976). 
  
 
 78 
a serious negative effect both on poverty and employment 
generation in these economies. 
 
XII.2 Job Creation in the Cities: Need for Action at Different 
Levels  
 
The conceptual analysis in Part II of the paper shows that long 
term trends in urban employment are shaped by, and in 
turn affect, endogenous forces of structural change 
(industrialisation, rural-urban migration and de-
industrialisation) during the course of economic 
development. However, this analysis also indicate that 
more immediately, urban employment prospects are very 
much dependent on international and national  macro-
economic environments. With globalisation, the 
international dimension has become ever more important. 
 National macro-economic developments, which are 
greatly affected by international economic forces have 
an overarching influence on job creation and job 
destruction. The main policy implication of this 
discussion is therefore that cities need to act at 
several levels to promote net job creation:  
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a) at the broadest international level, to influence global  
economic policies. 
  
b) at the national level, to affect macro-economic  and other 
national policies towards cities. 
 
c) at the city level, to affect employment prospects through a 
range of micro-economic and social measures. 
 
At this point in the argument one can easily imagine an 
overworked Mayor of New Delhi or Lagos or Chicago if he or she 
managed to get this far into the paper, finally throwing up their 
hands in exasperation and exclaiming that even if the analysis is 
correct, how can the cities influence international economic 
forces. Such despair is understandable but is nevertheless 
mistaken as the discussion below will suggest.  
 
XII.3  Action at the International Level 
 
With globalisation, cities and countries, particularly in the 
South are subject to huge global economic shocks. Witness recent 
events in Mexico. As a result of the financial crisis and its 
aftermath, analysts expect the country's GDP to shrink by 
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anything between 3 and 7 percent.The consequences for the urban 
economy are bound to be disastrous - there will clearly be 
reduced real wages, fewer jobs, and more poverty.  However 
efficient and dedicated the leaders of Mexico City may be, at 
best all that they might be able to do in these circumstances is 
to provide a few people some shelter from the economic hurricane. 
Even that may be difficult, but it certainly will not be possible 
for the civic leadership to  undertake policy measures at the 
local level to negate national macroeconomic trends. 
 
Therefore, as a very minimum, the leaders of large cities cannot 
any longer ignore the international economy. They have an 
obligation to understand the nature of global economic forces 
which may periodically devastate them. Even if they are unable to 
predict, they need to be prepared to cope with the human 
consequences of the next big economic shock that comes along. 
 
However, in this new age of globalisation, it is necessary for 
the cities to go further than simply to cope with the aftermaths 
of such hurricanes.They need to forge solidarity at the 
international level for their voices to be heard in the 
international economic councils. World economic forces are not 
entirely an impersonal phenomenon but also shaped by the people 
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we know - for example, the leaders of G7. It would not at all be 
incongruous for the Mayors of large cities, North and South to 
make representations at the G7 Summit so as to influence 
international economic policy making.  
 
On the employment question there is a common purpose between the 
cities of the North and the South. Cities should ask the G7 for 
priority to be given to employment, to raising the real rate of 
growth of world demand which will benefit both North and South
21
. 
Instead of letting international policy-making be dominated by 
banks and financial institutions simply by default, the civic 
leadership of the world's large cities should seek from the G7 
governments, policies which curb financial speculation and lead 
to more stable world economic conditions
22
.  
 
Thus, the globalisation of the economy requires a global 
partnership between city mayors.  Not only should cities 
represent their concerns to G7, group of Mayors should ask to 
                     
    
21
 For the complementary policies needed to achieve these aims 
without causing inflation see Singh (1995b). 
    
22
 See further UNCTAD 1994 and 1995. See also the World 
Employment Report 1995. 
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attend the World Bank-IMF Annual meetings to draw attention to 
their specific needs and requirements. 
 
For the civic leadership of the cities to understand the 
complexities of the international economy and to formulate 
appropriate policy responses, it is essential for them to develop 
a technical capacity for this purpose which most cities do not 
now possess. They will however also require such capacity for 
other important related tasks which will be outlined in the next 
section. 
 
XII.4  Action at the National Level 
 
Despite  the fact that large cities account for a 
disproportionate share of national production, the economies of 
most of them in developing countries are controlled and directed 
by the central government. By and large, big cities in these 
developing countries have very little financial autonomy and a 
grossly inadequate tax base in relation to their needs. Many of 
them depend on property taxes for most of their revenues. The 
main task of the city governments  appears to be to provide some 
social services  to the community . As the cities total tax 
revenues tend to be relatively small, even these social services 
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have to be normally covered in large part by grants from the 
central government (Oberai, 1993).  
 
 
This situation is unsatisfactory as well as inefficient. A de-
centralisation of decision-making and the devolution of economic 
power from the centre to the cities is highly desirable. Both 
economic analysis and practical experience indicates that these 
measures will have a positive effect on economic growth. To 
illustrate, many students of the Chinese economy regard de-
centralisation - the massive devolution of economic power from 
the Centre to the provinces and the cities and local authorities 
- to be a major factor responsible for the extraordinary economic 
growth in that country during the last decade.
23
 However, 
although it will be efficient for the cities to take over many of 
the economic functions presently performed by the central 
governments, they do not at present have the technical capacity 
to do so. 
 
City planning departments normally contain town planners, 
geographers and architects but hardly any economic planners. Such 
economic capacities need to be established so that cities can 
                     
    
23
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carry out properly the proposed new functions in a de-centralised 
national economy as well as in a liberalised world economy. The 
recent ESCAP report on urbanisation in the Asia-Pacific region 
puts this point lucidly and it is useful to quote them in full: 
 One main reason for the narrowness of local planning is the 
lack of understanding that most local officials have of 
their community's position in the national or international 
economic system. Typically, local officials possess little 
information regarding the way local economic activity fits 
into the national or international economic picture - i.e, 
what is produced in the local region, where it is shipped 
and to what users, what the current cost competitiveness of 
local products is and how it has changed in recent years, in 
what sub-sectors of the economy national demand is likely to 
grow fastest in the coming years, or who the locality's 
chief international competitors are and what cost structures 
these competitors face. 
 
 Realistic local economic development planning must start 
with this type of information and assessment. It then 
becomes possible to develop a "marketing plan" for the 
community, which targets for growth certain key sectors 
where it is feasible to enhance the city's market share. 
Specific strategies for encouraging local development can be 
evaluated in this context. 
 
 For example, a city's development analysis may determine 
that one of its strengths is a university with a well-
regarded medical school and a hospital which successfully 
services an entire regional area. A local growth strategy 
that builds on these strengths could encourage a city's 
development as a regional medical centre, by clustering 
medical offices and specialised labs around the hospital and 
medical schools. Most of the strategizing would take place 
in the private sector, land-use planning, site acquisition 
and clearing, road and other infra-structure provision are 
all development tools that the city might employ to support 
the development strategy.  Another city might conclude that 
a potential strength was the architectural and tourist value 
of an old part of the city that had fallen into despair. An 
area re-development strategy could include establishment of 
a building restoration fund, infrastructure renovation, 
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planning to facilitate tourist access, and encouragement of 
complementary retail activities. 
 
 Implementation of economic development strategies in the 
local level, of course requires that local governments have 
 significant authority over at least some of the important 
development tools - such as land use regulation, 
prioritization of local capital budgets, and budget 
authority to set up special development funds. It thus 
requires a degree of decentralisation in the  government 
structure. (page 3-27/28) 
  
 
 
XII.5 Action at the City Level 
 
 
XII.5.a.  Governance of the City 
 
 
Just as it is desirable to devolve decision-making from the 
centre to the cities, it is similarly useful to have devolution 
of power in the city itself. 
 in the day-to-day decision-making of the city should lead 
to more informed decisions, more democratic governance and a 
greater role for the civil society. It should also enhance 
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accountability and check bureaucratic tendencies within the city 
government. It is especially important that women's groups should 
be well represented and participate fully in such community 
organisations and in interactions with the city government. This 
is because there is evidence that a large proportion of the poor 
households in urban areas, even in developing countries, are 
headed by women. There are special needs of women for child care, 
flexible work arrangements which require the attention of the 
city authorities. 
 
The ILO has practical experience with cooperatives of various 
kinds, with self-help groups and with community organisations in 
different parts of the world. The lessons from this experience 
are outlined in box 5. 
 
 
XII.5.b.  Provision of Social Services, Infrastructural 
Development and Employment 
 
Although national macroeconomic environment and international  
economic conditions are the main determinants of employment, the 
normal local level city functions such as the provision of social 
services and the building and maintenance of the infrastructure, 
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can also affect employment. Health  and education services can be 
regarded as supply-side measures to increase productivity and the 
cities' long run competitiveness. This investment in human 
capital may over time have a positive influence on employment. 
 
Similarly, infrastructural spending also affects productivity and 
the attractiveness of the city as a place to live or to locate 
business. The techniques of production used to build or maintain 
the infrastructure - whether the technology is labour- or 
capital-intensive - influences employment. IlO's extensive 
experience in this area and what we learn from it are outlined in 
box 6. 
 
With respect to the provision of health and education, the 
relevant concerns are: (a) Do the programmes meet the special 
circumstances and life patterns of people living and working in 
the informal sector or in the slums?  (b) Similarly, are the 
problems of poor female headed households being adequately 
recognised at different levels in the city administration?  
 
Attention to such matters often requires a rather different 
orientation and perspective on the part of providers of services 
than they are normally accustomed to. It invariably becomes 
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necessary to conceptualize the activity in rather different terms 
than before. This is illustrated in the next sub-section by the 
analysis of the case of urban housing in the informal sector. The 
required reorientation of the city administration will be more 
easily achieved if there was more community participation and 
articulation of their needs by the poor themselves. 
 
XII.5.c Housing and Squatter Settlements 
 
The policy problems of housing are not only concerned with 
meeting the basic needs of the people for shelter, but also have 
an important bearing on a host of other issues such as the 
informal sector, employment generation, resource mobilisation and 
zoning laws.
24
 The standard view of housing is that it is a 
durable consumer good, a home with a roof and four walls.  
However, neither of these perceptions reflect the reality of the 
informal sector in third world cities. 
 
Housing therefore needs to be conceptualised in different terms 
to meet the real needs of the urban poor.  The classic functions 
of housing include the following: 
                     
    
24
 The following discussion is based on Perlman (1986). 
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 (1) housing as social consumption; 
 (2) housing as an improver of health and well-being; 
 (3) housing as a (macro) economic sector; 
 (4) housing as a stimulus to savings and investment; and 
 (5) housing as an indirect contributor to income and  
 production. 
 
 
Taking into account the realities of the informal sector, the new 
functions of housing should also include in addition the 
following: 
 
 (1) housing as shop; 
 (2) housing as factory; 
 (3) housing as rental income; 
 (4) housing as financial asset; 
 (5) housing as entry point in the urban economy; and 
 (6) housing as storage space or warehouse. 
 
The construction of housing is clearly a source of both 
employment creation and income generation. It can, however, also 
be a source of substantial resource mobilisation to the extent 
that with the aid of the "self-help" and "use participation" 
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schemes, it leads to informal sector dwellers using their own 
labour to improve and extend existing homes or build new ones. 
Despite the many limitations of such schemes, they do have 
significant multiplier effects on the urban   
economy. This more rounded view of housing and its significance 
is clearly important for policy decisions in this area. 
 
XII.5.d.  Deregulation, Labour Standards and the Informal Sector. 
 
In this era of deregulation, it is fashionable to argue that all 
government imposed regulations should be abolished. There are 
those who believe that to promote the informal sector, and to 
allow it to make its full contribution to the economy, require a 
bonfire of regulations.
25
 People need to soberly think about what 
will be the effect if this were to happen. A little bit of 
reflection will suggest that in this extreme form, this will be 
an untenable situation. There will be a constant threat to 
workers' health and safety. Similarly, abolishing the city zoning 
laws in order to promote the informal sector will lead to further 
degradation of the urban environment. To be sure, there are 
                     
    
25
 This, for example, is the essential message of the World 
Development Report 1995, which examines the role of workers in a 
globalised economy. 
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regulations which do not serve any useful purpose. But the 
general case is that there is a trade-off between two good 
things: say, for example environment and employment or safety and 
employment in the two cases mentioned above. Such trade-offs 
should be acknowledged and people should make an explicit 
democratic choice between the alternatives. 
 
A major difficulty in abolishing labour standards or in ignoring 
them altogether is that it is likely to generate, other things 
being equal, even more disguised unemployment. It will be 
socially divisive and will pit first world workers against third 
world workers. What the world needs is not simply more jobs, but 
more jobs with rising real wages and employment standards. This, 
as explained earlier, is only feasible if there is a trend 
increase in the rate of growth of real world demand. With a 
constant aggregate real demand,the abolition of labour standards 
and the promotion of total labour market flexibility would simply 
redistribute the same aggregate amount of work among a greater 
number of job seekers, leading to a fall in the price of labour. 
 Clearly, the first-best solution is to achieve both rising real 
wages and more jobs, and as noted earlier, that is perfectly 
feasible as the example of East Asia shows. Let us not forget 
that the  world has the new technology (ICT) whose full potential 
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is not been fully realised because of the inadequate growth of 
demand and output in regions other than in East-Asia.  
 
A different but important objection to labour standards is that 
these cannot be enforced in the informal sector in developing 
countries. A large proportion of informal sector businesses tend 
to be small and family-run. There is therefore force in the 
argument that the enforcement of labour standards is impractical 
in this sector of the economy. 
 
A constructive solution to this problem is however, to use 
education and the media to increase in the informal sector the 
awareness of the usefulness of labour standards for people's 
health and safety, and to show that they are not just good for 
workers, but also for the employers to the extent that they may 
lead to greater productivity. The labour standards in the 
informal sector should nevertheless, be voluntary and in any case 
should not be enforced by government inspectors.  Rather, the 
NGOs may be involved both in the educational task and in advising 
on methods for compliance with the standards. 
 
 
XIII. Conclusion 
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This paper has outlined the immense problems and the enormity of 
the tasks confronting those who lead the world's large cities, 
whether in the South or in the North. There has been some 
convergence in the problems facing cities in both regions. Every 
first world city today has a third world city within it 
(immigrant ghettos and slums), and every third world city has a 
first world city (the modern skyscrapers, banks, the fashion-
houses) within it. Nevertheless, urbanisation and the growth of 
the cities in the North and the South are subject to rather 
different underlying forces. 
 
Providing remunerative employment to third world's urban labour 
force which is growing at 3 percent a year is a daunting 
challenge, but not a hopeless one as the success of East-Asian 
countries (including China) demonstrates. Similarly, creating 
sufficient jobs to eliminate mass unemployment in the North is a 
formidable task. Here it is important to remember that most of 
these countries had more or less sustained full employment for 
more than two decades, in the fifties, sixties and early 
seventies. If such positive outcomes are possible today in the 
most populous part of the world, and were realised yesterday in 
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the most prosperous part, why should it be impossible for the 
whole world to move to the path of full employment again? 
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 BOX 4 
 
 
 Unemployment in Transition Economies  
 
The transition economies have experienced an acute crisis since  
1989, not so much because of shocks from the international 
economy as from the collapse of communism and its economic 
institutions, including comecon and the communist party. As a 
consequence, although a few countries are performing adequately, 
economies of most have performed poorly since 1989. Thus 
available data indicates that GDP in russia fell by .......... 
 
What has been the effect of this catastrophic fall in GDP on 
employment?  Here there is a puzzle and a controversy. Official 
data suggest that ........ 
 
However, the special surveys carried out by the ILO paint a 
rather different picture of the magnitude of Russian 
unemployment. Standing points out that a significant proportion 
of the officially employed are only nominally employed. They are 
officially on the payrolls of the enterprises except that they 
are not being paid even though they may turn up for work and be 
actually working.  Many are on long unpaid holidays. When all 
these factors are taken into account, the Russian unemployment 
figure soars to twenty five percent - a catastrophic waste of 
human potential. 
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